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ALEXANDER v. ESTEPP
95 E3d 312 (4Th Cir. 1996).
I. FACTS
Seven white job applicantsI denied employment by
the Prince George's County Fire Department ("County"
or "Department") sued the Department, claiming that its
affirmative action plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause.' Six of the plain-
tiffs had applied for firefighter positions with the
Department in 1993. That year, the Department hired
thirteen individuals, but not the plaintiffs. Three of the
plaintiffs applied again in 1994. One plaintiff, Josh Reedy,
applied to the Department for the first time in 1994.The
Department hired two of the plaintiffs in 1994, not
including Reedy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the county
and named officers of the Fire Department as individual
defendants.
Prince George's County tests applicants on perfor-
mance and a written examination. Those who pass both
are interviewed. They are then grouped into three
"bands": "Outstanding"; "Well Qualified"; and "Qualified."
Within each band, applicants are ranked based on their
"preference level."3 A county ordinance requires that
applicants within the same band be hired in the follow-
ing order:
(1) Current county employees seeking promotions;
(2) Disabled military veterans;
(3) Non-disabled veterans who were volunteer fire-
fighters;
(4) All other non-disabled veterans;
(5) All other former volunteer firefighters;
(6) Displaced homemakers not in any of the above
categories;
(7) County residents not in any of the above cate-
gories;
(8) All other persons.
The preferences for volunteer firefighters, (categories #3
'Six men and one woman
2Alexander v. Estepp, 95 E3d 312 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997). Because of practical constraints,
this case comment will address only the equal protection
claims of these seven petitioners. The case also held that (1)
with one exception, applicants would be denied personal relief
since they did not rank high enough to have been offered a job
even in absence of the program; and (2) county officials were
not qualifiedly immune from suit, since they should have
known that the program was unconstitutional.
'Alexander, 95 E3d at 314.
4Prince George's County Code § 16-162(d)(2)(i).
5 Prince George's County Code § 16-162(d)(4).
6Alexander, 95 E3d at 314.
and #5, above), however, may be eliminated if the coun-
ty's personnel officer certifies in writing to the fire chief
that continued use of the preference "will have a dis-
parate impact on a protected class as defined by the
guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission." Applicants within the same band who
have the same preference level are ranked on the basis
6
of their combined examination and interview scores.
The department maintains an "Applicant Register," which
lists the applicants and their total rank based on band,
preference and score. The county continually updates
the Applicant Register as new persons apply and existing
applicants withdraw their applications.
While the Department never committed its affirma-
tive action program to writing, it nevertheless took steps
to meet affirmative action goals set by the county in
accordance with census data. During each recruiting
season, fire department officials set informal "caps" on
the number of whites and the number of males who
would be offered employment. The department offered
applicants employment in the order in which they were
listed on the Applicant Register; but once a cap was
reached (either for whites or for males), a lower-ranking,
applicant of another race or gender was offered employ-
ment instead of a higher ranking, capped applicant.
Plaintiffs complained specifically about the hiring
procedures in 1993 and 1994. In 1993 the department
offered positions to thirteen applicants." According to
the Applicant Register, none of the plaintiffs ranked bet-
ter than fourteenth in that hiring season.12 In 1994 the
department offered employment to nine applicants.
Plaintiffs Marc Alexander and Angela Moore received and
accepted the positions offered them. 3 Plaintiff Josh
Reedy ranked eighth on the Applicant Register, but the'4
department did not offer him a position. The remaining
plaintiffs ranked lower than ninth. 5
7Alexander v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 901
ESupp. 986, 991(D.Md. 1995). Because the Applicant Register is
continually updated as part of the hiring process so that a com-
prehensive list is available, the district court ruled that it is a
business record admissible at trial under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), (8).






'3Id. at 315, n.4. Ms. Moore received an offer because of the




Plaintiffs sued seeking injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief. The district court rejected their claims
and entered summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dants. 16 Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decsion
that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had failed to support
allegations that they were denied employment because
the county "played with the process" to ensure hiring of
minorities. 7 The Plaintiffs also appealed the district
court's ruling that the Department's affirmative action
plan was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
II. HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit
applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to the
Department's affirmative action program and overturned
the district court's ruling on the grounds that the
Department's affirmative action plan was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest and thereby vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.'9 The Court of Appeals
never addressed the dispute over whether the asserted
governmental interests were compelling, but held that
the County's affirmative action program was not nar-
rowly tailored because the means chosen by the
Department were not closely related to the interests
asserted. It found that the program was not narrowly tai-
lored because means less drastic than outright racial clas-
sifications were available to Department officials to
achieve their goals. The County could have benefitted
African-Americans and women by eliminating the hiring
preference for firefighters from the volunteer depart-
ment where discriminatory attitudes were alleged to
originate. Additionally, the program was not narrowly tai-
"Id. at 315, n. 5. The district court held and the Court of
Appeals affirmed that all of the plaintiffs had standing, even
those who would not have been hired even in the absence of




20The County argued that its program was intended to ben-
efit African Americans and women by serving, among others,
the following goals: (1) redressing present effects of past and
current incidents of discrimination and harassment within the
department, (2) sending a message that the department
respects diversity and that discrimination and harassment will
not be tolerated, (3) promoting more effective fire prevention
and firefighting by fostering the trust of a diverse public, and
(4) serving educational goals by providing children with racial-
ly and sexually diverse role models.Alexander v. Estepp, 95 E3d
312 at 316.
21Alexander, 95 E3d at 316.
22Id. at 316.
lored because it "tende [d] to benefit particular minority
groups who had not been shown to have suffered invid-
ious discrimination."'2 According to the court, the pro-
gram treated all minority groups alike, even though the
County had presented evidence only of discrimination
against African- Americans. 3
III.ANALSIS/APPLICATION
The decision reached by the Court of Appeals in
Alexander v. Estepp is the result of nearly a decade of
Supreme Court inquiry into the issues of affirmative
action. Whether attempts to remedy past discrimination
are called "benign" or "reverse" discrimination, "racial
preferences" or "affirmative action," they refer to a wide
range of different processes by which people are treated
differently on the basis of race or gender with regard to
employment, education, or government contracts. Since
its influential holding, by a 5-4 vote, in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct.
2733 (1978), that the legal standards to be used in deter-
mining discrimination underTitle V1124 were the same as
those applicable to the Constitution's equal protection
guarantee, the Court has decided a dozen cases involving
affirmative action.25 The Supreme Court's lack of una-
nimity in these cases, as evidenced by its contradictory
opinions, attests to the incompatible goals, objectives,
and different understandings of affirmative action plans
as perceived by the Court and members of society as
well. One consequence has been a line of lower-court
affirmative-action-in-the-workplace cases including
Alexander v. Estepp, which illustrate the suspicion that
all racial classifications are unconstitutional.
In Wygant v.Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 106
S.Ct. 1842 (1986), the Court overturned a plan that pro-
23Id.
24Title VH of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that "[nlo
person ... shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
25Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984);
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 276 (1986);
Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers'International Association v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Local Number 93, International
Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501
(1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County Calif., 480 U.S.
616 (1987); City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.469
(1989); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pea, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
vided greater protection from lay-offs for black teachers
than for white. The Court relied on previous holdings
that the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefitted by a particular classification. 6 Even where
a race-conscious statute operates against a group (white
teachers) that has not historically been the victim of dis-
crimination, strict scrutiny must still be applied. 7 Strict
scrutiny demands that the racial classification "must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest"28 and
the means chosen must be "narrowly tailored to the
achievement of" that interest." 9 In addition, the court
pointed out that the remedying of "societal" discrimina-
tion alone does not justify use of race-conscious plans
because prior discrimination by the government unit
involved is of concern, not discrimination by society as a
whole.3"
Following Wygant, the Supreme Court went on to
evaluate several different types of race- conscious plans
including plans based on promotions, hiring goals and
quotas. In a companion case to Wygant, Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers'International Association v. EEOC,
476 U.S. 421 (1986), a five-Justice majority upheld a court
ordered "hiring goal" of 29% non-white membership in a
private union that consistently and intentionally discrim-
inated against non-whites. The Court indicated that the
remedy for past discrimination may be "class-based," that
is, those who receive benefits under a race-conscious
plan need not have been the particular victims of the
past discrimination being redressed. Similarly, a 5-4 deci-
sion in US. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S.Ct. 1053
(1987) upheld a court ordered plan requiring that a
black be promoted for every white promoted to corpo-
ral Alabama State Trooper positions. A majority of the
Court agreed that numerical quotas may be used by a
court in at least some circumstances to remedy past dis-
crimination.32 Like Sheet Metal Workers, Paradise
involved a history of blatant, intentional, pervasive dis-
crimination against non-whites.
In the landmark case, City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989), the
Supreme Court finally agreed that strict scrutiny should
be the standard of review applied to any form of race-31
conscious affirmative action programs. In Croson, the
26University of California Regents, 438 U.S. 265, at 291-299
(1978).
"Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718,724, n. 9 (1982).
2
8Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,432 (1984).
2'Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980).
Wygant v.Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. at 274.
31US. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-186 (1987).
32Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166.
33City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 469,472 (1989).
34at least 51% owned by minority group members
city of Richmond, Virginia, enacted a plan that required
prime contractors on construction contracts funded by
the city to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount
of the contract to one or more minority business enter-
prises.34 The majority struck down the city's set-aside
program and held that race- based affirmative action
plans to benefit minorities who historically suffered dis-
crimination must be subjected to the same strict scruti-
ny standard as actions that intentionally discriminate
31
against minorities.
Contrasting Croson's rigorous standards and back-
ward-looking approach, the Supreme Court in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) held that
"benign" federal racial classifications need only satisfy36
intermediate scrutiny, even though Croson had recent-
ly held that State-enacted racial classifications would be
subject to the strict scrutiny standard.37 Metro said that
certain racial classifications should be treated less skep-
tically than others and that the race of the benefitted
group is critical to the determination of which standard
of review to apply.3
Five years later in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200,115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995), the Supreme
Court overruled Metro, and relied on Croson in finding
that the federal government must satisfy the same "strict
scrutiny" standard for race-based affirmative action plans
as do state and local governments. Nonetheless, in the
opinion for the divided Court, Justice O'Connor offered
an assurance that the use of strict scrutiny did not nec-
essarily mean that the governmental action being
reviewed would be struck down.40 "The unhappy persis-
tence of both the practice and the lingering effects of
racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it." After
Adarand, a constitutionally sound race-based remedy
must meet rigid requirements. It must serve a compelling
interest, must be narrowly tailored not to overburden
innocent third parties, must be of limited duration and
must essentially be the only available response to proven
racial discrimination.
One year after the Supreme Court decided Adarand,
the Fourth Circuit decided Alexander v. Estepp, which
presented the question of whether a governmental affir-
35City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 472.3
6Metro applied an "intermediate level" of review in finding
that it was sufficient that the means chosen by Congress were
"substantially related" to the achievement of "important" gov-
ernmental objectives. Metro Broadcasting, Inc., 497 U.S. at 564-
565 (1990).371d., at 564-565.




mative action program for firefighters violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both
the district court and the Court of Appeals agreed that all
racial classifications, even those intended to benefit
minority groups, are subject to strict scrutiny.42
Therefore, the affirmative action program could be
upheld only if it was narrowly tailored to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the district court erred in holding
that the County's affirmative action program was nar-
rowly tailored.
The district court was mindful of the Supreme
Court's assertion that the application of strict scrutiny
45
was not necessarily fatal to affirmative action plans. In
deciding that the County's affirmative action plan was
narrowly tailored, the district court considered several
factors: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the
planned duration of the remedy; (3) the relationship
between the percentage of minority workers to be
employed and the percentage of minority groups in the
relevant population; (4) availability of waiver provisions;
and (5) the effect of the plan on innocent third parties.
The district court looked at each of these factors in
upholding the County Fire Department's affirmative
action hiring plan.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the
first factor: the efficacy of alternative remedies. It ruled
that the program was not narrowly tailored because
means less drastic than outright racial classification were
17
available to department officials. In particular, the
Prince George's County Code expressly provided that
the fire department could eliminate its preference for
volunteer firefighters in order to encourage diversity
48
within the department. If discriminatory patterns of
employment within the county fire department owed
their origin to practices and attitudes within volunteer
fire departments, the Department could simply have
denied volunteer firefighters the hiring preference they
enjoyed. 49 The Court of Appeals stated that the County
should have severed its ties with the allegededly dis-
criminatory volunteer fire department before relying on
a suspect classification.'s In 1984, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained that, "[t] he essence of the
"narrowly tailored" inquiry is the notion that explicit
42
43Alexander,95 E3d 315,citingAdarand, 115 S.Ct.at 2111.
Id., citing Adarand, 115 S.Ct at 2113.
Alexander, 95 F3d at 314.
'5Alexander v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 901
ESupp. at 992. The Court noted that gender based classifica-
tions are subject to "intermediate scrutiny," but the Court
addressed both aspects of the plan together for convenience.
46
Alexander v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 901 E
Supp. at 992, citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187.
racial preferences, if available at all, must be only a "last
resort" option."5'
In addition to inquiring into the County's failure to
consider alternative remedies, the Fourth Circuit found
the affirmative action program defective because it ben-
efitted particular minority groups that have not suffered
proven invidious discrimination.The department passed
over white applicants in favor of Hispanics and South
Asians, although there was no evidence on record of dis-
crimination against any group other than African-
Americans.
IV CONCLUSION
Despite the limitations set upon affirmative action
plans by the Supreme Court and followed by the Court
of Appeals in Alexander v. Estepp, hope for affirmative
action plans must not be abandoned. Justice O'Connor
speaks of this viewpoint in Adarand when she cites
United States v. Paradise as an example where "the
Alabama Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, sys-
tematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a
narrowly tailored race-based remedy." In referring to
Paradise, Justice O'Connor implies that only the most
extreme, apparent cases of discrimination will evoke an
acceptable affirmative action remedy. But, racism today is
often not so visible as in Paradise. Too often minorities
are denied opportunities in subtle ways that are not as
blatantly discriminatory as the conduct at issue in
Paradise, or in Sheet Metal Workers. The Supreme Court
should legitimize the forward looking goal of diversity
and realize the social and economic benefits of promot-
ing and encouraging minority inclusion by lowering the
strict scrutiny standard to the level of intermediate
scrutiny.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Metro Broadcasting,
upholding an intermediate standard of review, adheres to
the idea that there is a clear distinction between racial
classifications that are designed to help minorities and
those that discriminate against them. Unlike Justice
O'Connor who sees affirmative action as valid only when
used as a remedy for proven or admitted past discrimina-
tion and then only for the most blatant and pervasive






51Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10
E3d 207, 217 (4th Cir. 1993).
5 Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 237, citing
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167.
that believe that Brennan's opinion in Metro
BrOadcasting was correct: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. In his dissent in Adarand, Justice Stevens pointed
out that there is a difference between a "No Trespassing"
sign and a "welcome mat,"5 and between "a decision by
the majority to impose a special burden on the members
of a minority race, and a decision by the majority to pro-
vide a benefit to certain members of that minority
notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members. . 54
of the majority." However, the Court's majority includes
five Justices who have never voted to uphold an affirma-
tive action program based on race: Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. The Court has not approved
an affirmative action program since 1991 and the Court's
decisions seem to be narrowing in on the extinction of
affirmative action programs all together.
Necessarily, the strict standards the Supreme Court
applies to evaluate the constitutionality of an affirmative
action plan affect the likelihood that such a plan ever
will be employed or implemented. The very idea that an
institution must first admit to proven, past racial dis-
crimination, so pervasive and ongoing that it would war-
rant an affirmative action program that could satisfy the
current strict scrutiny standard, places a huge risk on
employers.As a result of the threat of litigation, employ-
ers who see racial disparities in their workforce are
extremely hesitant to employ any race based actions in
an effort to enhance diversity.
The goal of affirmative action has never been to pun-
ish or unnecessarily burden those in the majority who
have children to support and lives to live. But racism
remains active in America, and, to date, affirmative
actions programs are the most effective way the govern-
ment has created to give minorities some chance for
equal opportunity. Confusion surrounding the question
of just what affirmative action is seems to have erupted
into an attack on affirmative action programs. The result
has been the passage of anti-affirmative action programs
in the state of California by the UC Board of Regents and
the endorsement of such anti-affirmative programs by
Governor Pete Wilson. Alexander v. Estepp seems to be
an extension of this broad uprising, emphasizing the fact
that racism in the workplace, although subtle in form but
clearly evident in its results, will be permitted to flourish,
long after the strict scrutiny standard has choked the life
out of affirmative action in America.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Patricia White
"Id. at 245.
4Id. at 243.
